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The Plot 
J. Kent Clark 
Abstract 
The following essay on the Popish Plot is chapter nine of my biography of Thomas, 
5th Baron, 1st Earl, and 1st Marquess of Wharton; and perhaps it is the only chapter 
in the history of biography that barely mentions the name of the protagonist. This odd 
state of affairs arises because neither the political career of Thomas Wharton, who later 
became de facto prince of the Whigs, nor the English Revolution, which he vigorously 
supported, can be understood without considerable background knowledge of the famous 
Plot. The plot crisis, with its bizarre mixture of lies and truths, conditioned politics for 
years to come. 
If I could have assigned my readers to put down my biography after chapter eight 
and go read John Phillips Kenyon's excellent book The Popish Plot (London, New York, 
1972), I might have skipped this chapter entirely. Certainly I would never have written 
forty-odd pages on the subject (a total that will have to be reduced by at least half before 
the biography is published). On the other hand, I like to think that my treatment of 
the crisis, as I try to explain to myself and my contemporaries the hysterias of another 
age, has a certain immediacy for people who have cut their teeth on conspiracy theories, 
who have dealt with Fascist and Red Menaces, and who have learned to distrust their 
own governments and more especially their own secret police. I like to think too that 
the traumas of the past sixty years allow me and my readers to understand the actors in 
the Plot drama in a way that would have been difficult in a less threatened era. Finally, 
I have found the story of the Plot fascinating simply as a story. The world of Oates, 
Tonge, La Chaise, Scroggs, Charles, James, Coleman, Ruvigny, Danby, and Godfrey is 
at least as mad as our -own; and if I seem to be carried away in tracing the step-by-step 
development of a national nervous breakdown, I hope the reader will empathize. We will 
sober up later. 

The Plot 
J. Kent Clark 
The task of making the passions of one age understandable to another age is always 
formidable. Perhaps, like the description of old love affairs, it should be undertaken only 
by poets. Nowhere is this task more difficult than in the attempt to convey the emotional 
content of the Popish Plot three hundred years after the event. Here the fact that the 
words have remained unchanged constitutes a positive barrier to understanding. The 
intervening history has bleached and abraded the meanings of such terms as Catholic, 
Protestant, Jesuit, Presbyterian, and Anglican until they have essentially lost their func-
tion as battle flags and virtually all of their menace. Years of mutual toleration, along 
with the general secularization of society, have made Catholics and Protestants, except 
perhaps in Ireland, regard each other as amiable and only slightly deluded fellow citizens. 
In the 1990s, the very term popish seems quaint and slightly ridiculous, and a popish plot 
could not refer to anything more serious than a conspiracy against birth-control devices 
or a projected blockade of an abortion clinic. 
This does not mean, of course, that hysteria and bigotry have vanished from contem-
porary culture; it means only that they have changed fonns and that in general they are 
reserved for secular political crises. To understand viscerally, then, how an imaginary 
Catholic plot to assassinate Charles II could convulse England-how the paranoia of 
Israel Tonge and the elaborate lies of Titus Oates could produce judicial murders and 
transform English politics-we must add some recent analogies to the actual background 
of 1678.1 
The fundamental fact to be remembered about the Popish Menace in the seventeenth 
century is that like the Red Menace of a later age it was perceived as a foreign, interna-
tional threat, as well as a domestic conspiracy-a design to overthrow the government by 
violence. From- the time that Elizabeth I firmly established herself in power (after Queen 
Mary I had tried to re-Catholicize England with firebrands and faggots, and after an 
abortive rebellion by Northern nobles had been put down), there was little chance that 
any purely domestic uprising would restore the medieval order. There was sometimes 
1The best study, by many orders of magnitude, of the famous "Plot," is that of John Phillips Kenyon: 
The Popish Plot (London, New York, 1972). I have listed it in my short-title bibliography and used it 
extensively in my accounts of the "Exclusionist" period. -
1 
a serious chance, however, that an overwhelming foreign power, with the aid of En-
glish plotters, might succeed. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the 
paramount danger was from ultra-Catholic Spain-then the dominant military regime 
in Europe. This danger was intensified by the fact that in 1570 the Pope had formally 
deposed Elizabeth and absolved her Catholic subjects from their allegiance to the Crown. 
Philip II, with his Invincible Armada and his plan for invading England, intended not 
only to crush a rival nation but also to remove a heretical Queen and re-establish the 
true faith. 
Compared with such massive threats, the machinations of later, home-grown fanatics 
like Guy Fawkes, Robert Catesby, and their associates in the famous Gunpowder Plot 
seemed more mad than practical-especially as England became more and more solidly 
Protestant. 2 Without the backing of a sizeable foreign army, a knot of assassins was 
unlikely to accomplish anything but carnage. Because of the international connection, it 
should be added, and because extreme Catholics refused to swear allegiance to a heretical 
ruler, priests were classed as agents of a foreign government. Whereas Anglican martyrs 
had been burned as heretics, Catholic martyrs were hanged, drawn and quartered as 
traitors. 
As Spanish power waned and as the great Catholic monarchies, France, Spain, and 
Austria, became increasingly involved in fighting each other, the danger of foreign inter-
vention in England decreased. Bloody Mary, fires, martyrs, Spanish galleons, Philip II, 
and sanguinary plots became a memory, an old horror story; and although popery had be-
come inextricably linked in English minds with flames and violence, the anxieties abated. 
By the time Milton wrote "Lycidas," the great international menace had dwindled from 
a fearsome Armada to a wolf with "privy paw"-from a Wehrmacht or Red Army to a 
KGB, from the Duke of Parma's expeditionary force to a crafty band of Jesuits. Tem-
peratures were further reduced by the success of Gustavus Adolphus and his Protestant 
confederates against the Austrian Emperor in Germany. 
It was still dangerous for English politicians to be thought soft on Catholicism, as 
Charles I learned to his cost, and there was a flare-up of anti-popish hysteria with the 
Irish rebellion of 1641. In general, however, during the middle of the seventeenth cen-
tury, the peril for the Anglican Church and the traditional monarchy came from Puritan 
reformers, not from Catholic reactionaries. New presbyters and Cromwellian colonels 
replaced old priests and Catholic kings atop the list of Anglican enemies. At the time 
of the Restoration, then, though anti-popish penal laws remained on English books and 
priests were still officially banned from England as foreign agents, the laws were routinely 
evaded, indigenous Catholics were in little danger of prosecution, and Catholic peers sat 
in the newly restored House of Lords. In the wave of pro-monarchial enthusiasm, it 
was remembered that Catholics had fought on the side of Charles I and that Father 
20n 1 Nov. 1678, after the delations of Oates, the Commons feared another gunpowder plot and 
appointed a committee to search the houses near Parliament. No explosives were discovered, but the 
Clerk of the Works reported next day that the roof over the Commons was badly in need of repair-
liable, in fact, to collapse in a storm. The Commons moved to the Court of Requests while repairs were 
effected. HCJ, ix, 530-31. 
2 
John Huddleston, a Catholic priest, had helped the young Charles II to escape after the 
disastrous battle of Worcester. 
This state of de facto toleration was changed, as we have seen, by two ominous devel-
opments, one foreign and one domestic. On the Continent, France replaced Spain as the 
dominant military force. A new and efficient royal dictatorship, that is to say, replaced a 
disorganized and now moribund empire; the Most Christian King replaced His Catholic 
Majesty as a chronic threat to the balance of power. By 1672 there was once again an 
obvious foreign danger. And at home in England, the heir apparent to the throne turned 
Catholic. 
Either of these two circumstances was enough to alarm English Protestants, who 
then constituted about ninety-five percent of the population. Taken together, they were 
explosive. We might gain some faint idea of the fears involved by imagining a modern 
parallel. If the presidency of the United States were hereditary and included (besides 
control of the armed forces) the power of dissolving Congress at will, if the heir apparent 
was a recent and doctrinaire convert to Communism, if the Cold War was at its height 
and the Red Army at full strength, and if both the president and his heir were rightly 
suspected of taking money from the Kremlin, American nerves might be stretched as 
tautly as those of their English predecessors. And if some ex-defector after a tour of duty 
with the KGB should return with a long, circumstantial account of a Communist plot to 
assassinate the president and seize the government, American hysteria might match that 
which greeted the revelations of Titus Oates in the autumn of 1678. If, in addition, there 
were no newspapers in the country and no reporters to conduct independent investigations 
(if news travelled only by word of mouth or by letters), and if, finally, the magistrate 
who had received the first sworn, written statement of the sensational charges should be 
found mysteriously murdered, the public fury and frustration would be incandescent. No 
foreign agent or local collaborator named in the accusations or swept up in the subsequent 
probes could expect a trial much more dispassionate than those once conducted by Lord 
Chief Justice Sir William Scroggs. And any American Communist leader, whether named 
in the charges or not, would be well advised to leave the country-if he could get away. 
To return from modern analogies to the world of the Whartons, we may use 13 August 
1678 as the date when the match devised by Titus Oates was touched to the train of 
explosives provided by the political crisis. It was in the 1norning of that day that one 
Christopher Kirkby, acting on behalf of Dr. Israel Tonge, warned Charles II that his 
life was in danger,3 and it was in the evening of that day that Charles gave Kirkby and 
Tonge a private interview at Whitehall and heard from Tonge the outline of a Jesuit 
assassination plot. 
Israel Tonge, an Anglican clergyman who held a doctorate in divinity from Oxford, 
3 Kirkby knew Charles because of their mutual interest in "chemistry"; that is to say, alchemy, phar-
macology, and chemistry. Charles had a "chemical" laboratory in Whitehall under the direction of Sir 
Thomas Williams. (See Goodwin Wharton, pp. 24, 333-34). It was easy, therefore, for Kirkby to meet 
Charles on the Whitehall stairs and convey his warning. 
3 
had long been obsessed with the danger from Jesuits,4 and he had been convinced that 
they or their abettors were responsible for the Great Fire of London. Recently he had 
become re-acquainted with a young man, Titus Oates, who actually knew Jesuits. The 
twenty-nine year old Oates, once an Anglican cleric, 5 had spent more than a year as a 
recruit in the Jesuit organization in France, Spain, and England; and he had sometimes 
run errands for Jesuit officials. Oates reported to a thrilled and horrified Tonge that the 
Jesuits were even more dangerous than Tonge had supposed. Besides burning London, 
as Tonge had suspected, they had devised a series of plans to assassinate Charles II and 
to "take off" a few other prominent anti-Catholics, including Tonge himself. They also 
planned to stir up insurrections in all parts of the British Isles. For Tonge's benefit, 
Oates had put his discoveries in writing-in a detailed narrative of forty-three numbered 
paragraphs.6 It was this long account (recopied in Tonge's own handwriting to conceal 
Oates's identity) that Tonge brought to Whitehall and his interview with Charles. 
Oates's strange story had been made plausible by its shower of details and its matter-
of-fact tone. Anything but a neat, carefully crafted account of a conspiracy, it was a series, 
roughly chronological, of what purported to be first-hand observations and conversations 
involving Jesuits; it included episodes both trivial and important, and the author seemed 
to have no clear idea of which was which. The document was time-consuming to read 
and difficult to condense. When Tonge brought it to Charles, the King did not try to 
study the handwritten pages in detail. Like any busy executive, he had Tonge summarize 
the charges and read a few crucial passages. Then, after asking some questions about 
the alleged plot and the writer (whose identity Tonge concealed, as he had promised), 
Charles ended the interview. The next morning, before leaving for Windsor, he handed 
the papers over to a trusted attendant and ordered them to be passed on to Danby for 
evaluation. 
Besides the apparent artlessness of the narrative, there were other reasons why Charles 
could not dismiss the conspiracy story out of hand. The account was liberally sprinkled 
with verifiable facts, with names and aliases of real people. There was enough accu-
4Israel (or Ezerel) Tonge had begun lambasting the Jesuits in print in 1670, when he published The 
Jesuit Morals. Collected by a Doctor of the College of Sorbon [Nicolas Perrault] ... and exactly translated 
into English [by Israel Tonge]. The tone of Tonge's later attacks can be gathered by some of their titles: 
Jesuitical Aphorismes ... (London, 1679); The New Design of the Papists Detected ... (London, 1679); 
Jesuits Assassins: Or The Popish Plot Further Declared, and demonstrated in their Murderous Practices 
and Principles (London, 1680). 
50ates had begun life as an Anabaptist. His father, Samuel Oates, an Anabaptist preacher, had 
been a chaplain in Cromwell's army. The senior Oates conformed to the Established Church at the 
Restoration (when young Titus was eleven) and secured the living of All Saints at Hastings. Titus 
himself attended Cambridge, from which he left without receiving a degree. He was able to take holy 
orders, nevertheless, and held a few minor church positions before he defected to the Jesuits. Oates's 
early sectarian background gave a curious flavor to some of his "revelations." 
6The narrative, recast as sworn testimony and enlarged to eighty-one numbered paragraphs, is printed 
in HLJ, xiii, 313-30, and State Trials, vi, 1430-71. It also appears in Titus Oates, A True Narrative 
of the Horrid Plot and Conspiracy of the Popish Party, against the Life of His Sacred Majesty, the 
Government, and the Protestant Religion ... (London, 1679) and [Titus Oates], The Discovery of the 
Popish Plot, being the several Examinations of Titus Oates D. D ... (London, 1679). A MS copy survives 
in Rawlinson D. 720, fols. 172-91. In referring to passages in the narrative, I cite HLJ. 
4 
rate information to enable a government that was so inclined, even without the aid of 
anything resembling a modern police force, to roll up the Jesuit apparatus in England. 
There was enough information, in fact (though Oates had not said so), to suggest cul-
pable negligence on the part of the present government. The odd tale warranted further 
examination, therefore, if only to compare its allegations with the facts in the possession 
of the authorities. Even misinformation and current rumors were valuable to Crown 
officers. 
In another way, too, the story that Tonge brought the King had political value. Oates 
had cast Charles as a Protestant hero-somewhat besmirched, to be sure, but a hero 
nevertheless. Charles appeared as the prime enemy of the Jesuits and England's bulwark 
against a flood of popery. Whereas Andrew Marvell had pictured Charles as at least a 
passive co-conspirator in the movement toward popery and arbitrary power, Oates filled 
his pages with virulent Jesuit denunciations of the King-the "Black Bastard" 7 who 
stood between the Jesuit order and power. Oates was also careful to exculpate the Duke 
of York. Far from being a plotter against his brother, whom he loved, James in the Oates 
version was another problem for the conspirators. He would inherit the crown, naturally, 
but if he showed the slightest reluctance to follow Jesuit orders and force popery upon 
England, he would be assassinated too. 8 This whitewashing of the King and the Duke 
would soon become an embarrassment to Whig propagandists and to Oates himself. In 
the beginning, however, it was something like a guarantee of good faith. Shaftesbury and 
his friends were highly unlikely to write such stuff.9 
Beyond these obvious considerations, Charles had one more reason for sending along 
the document for further analysis. Monarchs were always well advised to take assassina-
tion plots seriously, even when they were revealed by dotty old clergymen who would not 
name their informants. Among all the allegations that had been thrown into the Oates 
narrative, like a handful of firecrackers, there might be some worth investigating. Charles 
could not really afford to overlook the possibility that so1ne Catholic zealot, or combina-
tion of zealots, might try to get him out of the way-that some latter-day Babingtons10 
would decide to hurry the popish succession along. 
With the conversion of James to Catholicism the situation had reverted to that of 
the days when Mary, Queen of Scots, was a possible successor to Elizabeth and hence a 
strong incitement to conspiracies among popish fanatics. Now, just as loyal Protestants, 
though duty bound to pray for James as a member of the royal family, could hardly 
7 HLJ, xiii, 315. Oates's narrative method allowed him to call Charles names while picturing him as 
essential to Protestant safety. 
8 Interestingly enough, Oates also exculpated the English secular clergy from any involvement in 
assassination plots. Ordinary priests, Oates said, were "inclined to live in Peace and Obedience to 
their Prince" (HLJ, xiii, 316). All the danger came from the regular orders-the Jesuits, Dominicans, 
Benedictines, and Carmelites-and principally from the Jesuits, who were the most fanatical. Thomas 
Pickering, one of the men assigned to shoot Charles in the Oates account, was a Benedictine. 
9Though Shaftesbury later made great political capital from the Plot, he had nothing to do with 
Oates's original narrative. For an excellent summary of Shaftesbury's role in the melee that followed the 
Oates "revelations," see Shaftesbury, pp. 453-62. 
10 Anthony Babington was one of the leaders of a plot against Elizabeth I in 1586. 
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help hoping that he would die before his brother Charles, so loyal Catholics, a repressed 
minority, could hardly help hoping the opposite. Meanwhile, an international society 
owing no loyalty to the King and dedicated to the spread of the Catholic faith might be 
tempted to do something more than hope. Though Charles could be perfectly sure of 
James's innocence, he could not be perfectly sure of James's Jesuit friends. It seemed 
only sensible, then, to run at least a preliminary check before dismissing the matter and 
before warning James that his friends were under investigation. 
If Charles had taken time to study Oates's account in detail, he might have concluded 
that the Jesuits, though elaborate -and tireless plotters, were hopelessly inept as mur-
derers. The first two assassins assigned to what should have been a relatively simple 
task11 had failed-one because he became too "faint hearted" 12 to kill the King (though 
promised £1,500 for the assassination) and the other because he had forgotten to check 
the flint in his pistol, which turned out to be loose when he was ready to shoot Charles in 
St. James's Park. Neither attempt had been detected, and both men (John Grove and 
Thomas Pickering) had been reassigned to complete their task. Their superiors, mean-
while, to make doubly and triply sure, had raised large sums to have the King stabbed 
or poisoned. Most recently they had sought to bribe Sir George Wakeman, the Queen's 
Catholic physician, to do the poisoning. After more than a year of plots, nevertheless, 
and after a full-scale Jesuit conference on the subject, Charles had remained healthy and 
unaware that he was threatened. 
The Jesuits were similarly inept, in Oates's original account, in providing suitable 
military backup for their plot. Oates knew something about the Jesuit organization but 
very little about realpolitik. He did not seem to understand that if he was right about 
James's patriotism and if James was left in command of the army and the militia (and if 
he took reasonable care to protect himself), the assassination of Charles would succeed 
only in getting Catholic priests hanged from trees. Oates's vague accounts of projected 
risings in Scotland and Ireland, perhaps with French help,13 did not provide an adequate 
threat. To make the plot ultimately credible, he needed to supply the names of the 
military and political leaders, 14 and he needed to produce foreign invasion forces capable 
of seizing and holding power. 
About one feature of Oates's narrative, Charles knew more than Oates himself, and 
what he knew was a dangerous embarrassment to the government. Though wrong about 
the precise date and place, Oates had been right about a Jesuit "consult" in England. 
11 It is worth noting that if Kirkby had been a determined assassin, he could have stabbed Charles on 
the steps of Whitehall. 
12 HLJ, xiii, 313. 
13The Irish, Oates said, would be ready with 25,000 men if the French King wished to land soldiers 
in Ireland ( HLJ, xiii, 317); but he did not state categorically that Louis actually intended to invade. 
Tonge, perhaps aware of the weakness of Oates's account, improved the story when he talked with the 
King. He told Charles that the assassination scheme was a prelude to a French invasion. With Charles 
"knocked in the head" and with England, Ireland, and Scotland in confusion, James could not defend 
the kingdom against the French (Kenyon, p. 52). 
14In his original story, Oates said that the Pope had issued commissions to Irish plotters (HLJ, xiii, 
317), but he did not name the plotters or provide English counterparts. 
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Oates had placed it at the Whitehorse Tavern in the Strand and given the date as early 
May. 15 After the general session attended by about fifty men, he alleged, the members 
had formed a number of small groups and taken up quarters in the area. In carrying 
messages back and forth between such groups, he said, he had picked up information 
about the plot. 
Actually, the Jesuit meeting had been held on 24 April, it consisted of forty members 
of the order, and it had not taken place in the Whitehorse Tavern but in St. James's 
Palace, the residence of the Duke of York.16 This last fact Charles and James felt obliged 
to conceal at all costs (much as a president of the United States might wish to conceal a 
meeting of Soviet agents in the White House), and their need for secrecy17 would later 
prove a severe handicap to Jesuit defendants, who could not divulge the truth or call 
James to witness that Oates was lying about the place and purpose of the "consult." They 
could not convince prejudiced juries that Oates's sinister gathering (designed, Oates said, 
to plot the King's murder) was simply a regular triennial meeting of the Jesuit order or 
that Oates was attending the Jesuit seminary at St. Omers, in France, when he said he 
was in London carrying incriminating messages between non-existent subgroups. 
The second crucial date in the developing drama of the Plot was 6 September 1678. 
On that day Titus Oates took an expanded version of his narrative to Sir Edmund Berry 
Godfrey, a noted London Justice of the Peace, and swore to the truth of his story. In 
the interval between 12 August and the interview with Godfrey, the fuse lit by Oates 
and Tonge had sputtered and threatened to go out. Danby had interviewed Tonge and 
Kirkby and launched an investigation of Oates's charges; he had detailed men to find 
15The date 24 April 1678 (the actual date of the "consult") appears in Oates's narrative, but there 
it seems to be the date on which the Jesuits from St. Omers and other Continental sites left to attend 
the London conference. The meeting at the Whitehorse Tavern, in the Oates version, was "held in the 
month of May." HLJ, xiii, 317. Oates was wrong about the place and the exact time of the meeting 
because he was in St. Omers while it was going on. 
160n 8 May 1685, after James had become King, he revealed this fact to Sir John Reresby. Speaking of 
Oates's imaginary meeting at the Whitehorse Tavern, "the King [James] said indeed ther was a meeting 
of the Jesuists [sic] on that day [24 April 1678], which all the schollars of St. Omers knew was to be, 
but it was well Doctor Oats knew no better where it was, for it was then in St. James his [St. James's], 
wher the said King then dwelt; for, said the King, if that had been understood by Oats, he would have 
made ill worke for me." Memoirs of Sir John Reresby, ed. Andrew Browning (Glasgow, 1936), p. 365. 
The Jesuit John Warner (later chaplain to James) says that when Charles II examined Oates before 
the Privy Council [on 29 Sept. 1678) he knew that Oates was lying about the Jesuit assembly at the 
Tavern, "since he was aware that they had forgathered in the palace belonging to the Duke of York" [St. 
James's]. [John Warner], The History of English Persecution of Catholics and the Presbyterian Plot, ed. 
T. A. Birrell, tr. John Bligh (London, 1953), p. 199. Of course, Warner adds, Charles could not reveal 
this secret knowledge to his Protestant Council. 
17The danger to the political future of the Duke posed by the secret meeting at St. James's prompted 
Sir John Pollock to construct an elaborate theory on the murder of Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey. Godfrey, 
says Pollock, inadvertently learned about location of the meeting from his friend Edward Coleman, 
Catholic ex-secretary of the Duke, and the Jesuits were forced to kill him to shut his mouth. The Jesuits 
reasoned that if the secret leaked out James would be excluded from the throne, if not beheaded, and 
that they would never come to power in England. Sir John Pollock, The Popish Plot, 149-166. It should 
be added in passing that James's decision to host a Jesuit conference at the palace was something less 
than inspired. 
7 
and shadow some of the men Oates had named, and he set up a watch at the Post Office 
to intercept suspicious letters. Though Oates, who was busy improving and lengthening 
his story, had supplied Tonge with additional details, Danby could find no independent 
corroboration. He found instead something that made him suspect the whole story to be 
a malicious fabrication. At Windsor, where the King and Duke of York had gone after 
the King's interview with Tonge, the Duke's Jesuit confessor Francis Bedingfield (whose 
name, misspelled Bennifield, had appeared in the narrative) received through the mail 
five strange and "wildly incriminating" letters.18 Four of these bore the signatures of 
clerical plotters named in the Oates document and one purported to be from an Irish 
physician named Fogarty/9 but it seemed obvious to Bedingfield, who knew the Jesuit 
correspondents, that both the letters and the signatures were crude forgeries. Though 
neither he nor James, to whom he went immediately with the disturbing letters, had 
heard anything about the Oates story, both suspected some kind of trap; and when 
Danby and Charles learned of the forgeries, they could readily guess what the trap was. 
The letters had been written, they reasoned, to corroborate Tonge's story and to further 
incriminate Bedingfield and his alleged correspondents. The forgers, overestimating the 
efficiency of Danby's agents, had expected the letters to be intercepted at the Windsor 
post house. 20 
The conspiracy story was temporarily damaged by the forgeries. Charles was ready 
to dismiss the whole plot as a hoax, and Danby suspected, in addition, that Tonge had 
invented the tale himself. Both men suspected that Tonge was 1nore than a little mad. 
The narrative, after all, was in his handwriting, and he had not produced the supposed 
author. But the fiasco evoked its own train of consequences. For one thing, it showed 
Tonge that he was alone and dangerously exposed. If Oates was "1nade away" by the 
Jesuits or if he simply disappeared, as he frequently did, and if his charges were judged 
false and malicious, Tonge was in serious trouble. As a clergy1nan, he might escape with 
his ears and he might even avoid the pillory. He could not escape ridicule, however, or 
the charge (in Burnet's phrase) that he had lost "what little sense he had." 21 It was 
essential, then, that he should get a sworn statement from Oates about the authorship 
of the narrative, as well as its truth. It 1nay have occurred to Tonge also that it would 
be wise to put a copy of the all-important document in official hands more reliable than 
those of the King and the Lord Treasurer, who might find political reasons to smother 
the Plot. In any case, Tonge found Oates and succeeded in persuading him to appear, 
with his fateful narrative, before Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey. 
Another consequence of the forgery episode was that it alarmed and angered James. 
There were obviously some defamatory and dangerous anti-Catholic charges circulating 
about, and he wanted the authors exposed and punished. He did not understand that 
the last thing the Catholic cause needed was public trials over alleged plots, whether real 
18Kenyon, p. 59. 
19To the alleged letters of Jesuits Thomas Whitbread (alias White), William Ireland, John Fenwick, 
and William Blundell, Oates had added one by William Fogarty, Oates's Irish physician. Fogarty was 
about to be added to the list of plotters and pictured as a manager of the Plot in Ireland. 
20Sir Robert Southwell to the Duke of Ormonde, 1 Oct. 1678, HMC, Ormonde, N. S., iv, 456. 
21 Burnet, ii, 153. 
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of imaginary, nor did he yet know the extent of the genuine information scattered among 
the Oates fantasies. 
Meanwhile, the Danby investigation brought its own dangerous consequences. One 
was that in questioning Tonge about possible Catholic plotters, Danby inadvertently 
provided him (and therefore Oates) with some crucial names for Oates's rapidly expand-
ing narrative. Most fatally, Danby dropped the name of Edward Coleman, a Catholic 
convert of about thirty who had once served as secretary to the Duke of York and later 
as secretary to the Duchess. Beyond that, the process of investigation itself necessarily 
widened the circle of people who knew some or all of the story. Danby's servants and 
agents, though pledged to silence, would not keep their secrets forever. Soon Catholic 
suspects would be warned of their danger, and rumors would begin to float about London. 
By 6 September, when Tonge took the precaution of bringing Oates and his story 
before Godfrey, the conspiracy story, which seemed virtually dead after the suspected 
forgeries, was in fact still alive and growing beyond repression. Shortly before that date, 
sometime in early September, 22 Oates had reached the point of no return. The elaborate 
lies he had constructed to impress a crackpot minister and to vent his spleen against the 
Jesuits, who had expelled him from St. Omers as a misfit and a homosexual threat to 
young men, had been taken with deadly seriousness and turned over to the government. 
They were now being investigated, and if they were proven false, his future was apt to be 
nasty and brutish, and conceivably short. On the other hand, he had not yet sworn to the 
truth of his story and thus added perjury to malicious mischief. Since he had disguised 
his handwriting in the document he had given Tonge, he could still deny authorship of 
the narrative, perhaps with success. If he was extremely fortunate, he might be able drop 
out of sight and leave his friend Tonge holding the bag. He still had a chance, in short, 
to turn back before he was committed forever to his deadly tale. 
But if lying was a tangled and dangerous business, it was also a heady one. Perhaps 
for the first time in what had been a drab, unsuccessful, and sometimes sordid life, Ti-
tus Oates found himself taken seriously. A cast-off from the clergy, both Anglican and 
Catholic, he was about to become the central character in a sweeping national drama. 
Now on the verge of gaining the attention he had always craved, he had a chance, if he 
wrote his script plausibly, to crowd peers and bishops off the stage. Impressively too, 
he had discovered a remarkable talent for lying-not as remarkable, perhaps, as that of 
Mary Parish, the woman who would soon direct the life of Tom's brother Goodwin, but 
a massive talent nevertheless. 23 He found also, like a lucky novelist, that his story grew 
easily. As Tonge raised questions, including those relayed from Danby, and suggested 
possible suspects, Oates was able to extend and sharpen his tale, and as he reviewed 
his experiences among the Jesuits, he could dredge up more names and construct more 
episodes. In the end, he simply could not abandon his sensational fiction and his absorb-
22 Kenyon, p. 60. 
23 
"If he be a liar," wrote Secretary of State Sir Henry Coventry after hearing Oates testify before 
the Privy Council, "he is the greatest and adroitest I ever saw .... " Coventry to the Duke of Ormonde, 
1 Oct. 1678, HMC, Ormonde, iv, 207. 
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ing new vocation. On 4 September when he agreed to appear before a JP, he irrevocably 
chose notoriety over caution. He would stick with his story. 
Oates had other good reasons for cooperating with Tonge. Besides offering fervent 
praise and useful suggestions, Tonge could offer immediate subsistence (no small item 
to an unemployed cleric), and his plan of taking the narrative to Sir Edmund Berry 
Godfrey offered Oates another layer of insurance against Catholic reprisals. Oates may 
not have believed his own propaganda-that the Jesuits were cold-blooded killers who 
would dispatch him without a second thought once they were sure he was bringing deadly 
charges against them-but he apparently did believe that they or their friends might 
devise some unpleasant way of shutting his mouth. They might have him beaten up or 
spirited out of the country. By early September, when his story was beginning to take 
air, he became uneasy; and he saw that an appearance before the reliable, incorruptible 
Godfrey offered a measure of safety. It effectually guaranteed that anything untoward 
that happened to him would be blamed on the Jesuits. As a further precaution, Oates 
went to stay with Tonge and Kirkby in Vauxhall, away from the usual haunts of his 
former friends. 
When Oates took his narrative to Godfrey, he and Tonge made sure that the story 
could not be stifled, but they did not convince the government that it was true. In 
receiving the document, Godfrey did not vouch for its contents; he merely recorded the 
fact that Oates had sworn to its truthfulness. From the point of view of Charles and 
Danby the story had not become more credible; it had only become more difficult to 
contain. The infection had broken out in a new and respectable neighborhood. Their 
first strategy, when their agents failed to turn up corroborative evidence, was to wait for 
the episode to gutter out like other wild conspiracy tales. Charles, at Windsor, cut off 
communications with Tonge and Kirkby, and Danby maintained "a prudent reservedness" 
on the few occasions he allowed Tonge an audience. For about three weeks, Tonge 
was reduced to scurrying around to influential but skeptical friends, including Gilbert 
Burnet24 and Bishop Henry Compton, and trying to prod the government into action. 
Meanwhile, Oates continued to expand his narrative, which by 27 September had 
grown from forty- three to eighty-one paragraphs. In the extended version, Sir George 
Wakeman "had taken the business into his hand" ;25 he had finally agreed, that is, to 
poison the King. As insurance, the Jesuits had assigned John I{eynes, George Conyers,26 
and four anonymous Irishmen (in addition to Grove and Pickering) to stab or shoot 
Charles as opportunity offered. The Jesuits also planned to kill the Duke of Ormonde 
in Ireland as a prelude to the great insurrection there, and they were assembling a force 
of 20,000 papists for a rising in London when Charles was dispatched. Naturally they 
expected to set fires at strategic places about London, as they had done at the time of 
the Great Fire in 1666 and the Southwark fire of 1676. Somewhat less formidably, they 
24 Burnet, ii, 147. Tonge, says Burnet, "was a gardener and a chymist, and was full of projects and 
notions." 
25 HLJ, xiii, 320. Wakeman was to receive £15,000 when his task was completed. 
26 0ates described in detail the formidable dagger that Conyers ("a Benedictine Monk") had bought 
from a cutler in Russell Street. 
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plotted a rebellion in Scotland involving 8,000 men, and they recruited some Benedictines, 
Dominicans, and Carmelites to help with their complex schemes. 
As matters turned out, Oates's elaborate descriptions of assassination plans proved 
to be less important than some incidental information he offered about communications 
and finance. The Jesuits, he said in effect, did a certain amount of spying for the French 
government; they collected secret information about English affairs and passed it on, 
via St. Omers, to Fran~ois La Chaise,27 the Jesuit confessor of Louis XIV. La Chaise 
(spelled Leshee by Oates) in turn sometimes provided the English Jesuits with money; 
he furnished, for example, most of the £15,000 that was to be given Wakeman when 
he had poisoned the King. The Jesuits' chief intelligence agent in England, Oates said, 
was a man named John Smith, who haunted Whitehall and the lobbies of Parliament. 
Smith was sometimes assisted, Oates added, by "one Coleman," who provided him with 
"private intelligence." 28 Oates did not go on to say that "one Coleman" was Edward 
Coleman, ex-secretary to the Duke of York, and he clearly did not realize that in naming 
Coleman and La Chaise (Leshee) in the same paragraph he had said the magic words that 
would soon validate the Popish Plot to his countrymen. He did add, however, in a later 
paragraph, that Coleman had been present at a "consult" when Sir George Wakeman 
had agreed to poison the King. 
While Oates was copying and recopying his revelations, Charles finally decided that 
the Plot story was spread too widely to go away and that it must be officially recognized 
and squelched. Perhaps influenced by James, he decided to bring Tonge, the letters to Be-
dingfield, and the Oates narrative before his Privy Council. This he did on 28 September, 
the third decisive date in the history of the Plot. 
In the morning session, the King's strategy seemed to work perfectly. After hearing 
Charles outline briefly his dealings with Tonge and after seeing the crudely constructed 
Bedingfield letters, the Council was disposed to regard the assassination plot as a sham; 
and when Tonge appeared for questioning, he did little to change minds. His reputation 
as a hysterical anti-Catholic had preceded him,29 and of course he had no first-hand infor-
mation about assassination plots. Beyond providing an unconvincing one-page summary 
of Oates's story, he could only complain about the obstruction he had encountered in 
his attempt to warn the nation of its mortal danger. But while Tonge was being "alto-
gether smiled at" 30 by an indulgent Council, he made one crucial point. He could not do 
justice to Oates's narrative by trying to summarize it, he said, and in any case his own 
reporting could be nothing more than hearsay. He asked permission, therefore, to bring 
Oates himself to testify at the afternoon session, and the Council agreed. Charles saw 
27For biographical sketches of La Chaise, whose full name is Fran<;ois d' Aix de La Chaise, see Bio. 
Univ., xxii, 549-51; NBG, xxvii, 483-94. 
28 HLJ, xiii, 320. 
29Secretary of State Sir Joseph Williamson, who took notes on the Council meeting, explains, in a 
marvelously patronizing tone, that "All encouragement possible [is] to be given to Mr. Tonge." CSPD, 
xx (1678), 425. The government obviously thought that Tonge should be given every chance to make a 
fool of himself and no reasonable chance of accusing the Council of trying to stifle the Plot. 
30Sir Robert Southwell to the Duke of Ormonde, 1 Oct. 1678, HMC, Ormonde, N. S., iv, 455. 
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no threat in the arrangement. Apparently satisfied with the way the investigation was 
proceeding, he assigned Prince Rupert to conduct the afternoon session and then left for 
the races at Newmarket. 
Charles left too soon; he would never again come so close to stifling the Plot. He had 
reckoned without the fact that his Council had not actually read Oates's narrative and 
that the members were totally unprepared for the deluge of information it contained. 
More significantly, he had not suspected that Titus Oates might be a remarkable and 
intrepid actor. The fact that the Council had not done its homework was not the fault 
of the members. The day before the meeting, Tonge had provided Danby with a copy 
of Oates's complete narrative, with its eighty-one handwritten paragraphs, but neither 
Danby nor Secretary of State Sir Joseph Williamson, to whom Danby entrusted some 
of the Plot papers "rolled up," attempted to have their top-secret documents copied 
for their colleagues. They simply brought the manuscripts to the Council meeting and 
handed them over to the Clerk, Sir Robert Southwell. This meant that the twenty or so 
members of the Council could only glance through the papers; no one could devote the 
hour or two that a close study of the Oates narrative requires. 31 
When Oates appeared that afternoon, he gave the performance of his life. Razor 
sharp from having worked for two 1nonths on his story and having just recopied the final 
version for Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey (whom he had seen again the previous morning), 
he had every date and name at instant command, and without reference to his papers he 
could walk the Council through his narrative with cool assurance. After swearing to the 
truth of his revelations, he proceeded to bombard his audience with facts about the Jesuit 
organization in England, including its finances,32 and about its connections in France and 
Spain. He took the Council, in effect, from England to Burgos and Valladolid, back to 
England, over to St. Omers, and back once 1nore to England. As he went from one Jesuit 
stronghold to another, he named verifiable names of men who, he said, were conspiring to 
get rid of Charles. He described assassination plots and projected insurrections in crisp 
detail, pausing now and then to answer questions or drop another name. The Council 
could not help being impressed. The sheer intricacy of the testimony was numbing. As 
Burnet later remarked, the story "consisted of so many particulars, it was thought to be 
31 Sir Joseph Williamson writes, "The papers as put rolled up into my hands yesterday [27 Sept.] at the 
Foreign Committee to be produced this day were now produced and lodged in the Clerk of the Council's 
hands." (Williamson's notes, 28 Sept. 1678, CSPD, xx, 1678, 425.) Unfortunately, Williamson does not 
say which papers he was given. Kenyon (p. 67) believes he was given the extended Oates narrative; but 
Sir Robert Southwell, who received the documents, says that it was Danby who brought in "a bundle 
of papers importing a conspiracy of the Jesuits" [i.e., the narrative] and that Williamson brought the 
Bedingfield letters to-the CounciL Southwell to the Duke of Ormonde, 1 Oct. 1678, HMC, Ormonde, N. 
S., iv, 455, 456. It is possible that Southwell, writing three hectic days after the event, remembered his 
documents backwards and that Williamson brought the Oates MS. In any case, it is clear, as Kenyon 
rightly points out, that the Privy Council had not seen the Oates narrative and that this fact became 
very important. Southwell himself was at first stunned by the revelations and by Oates's performance. 
Southwell to Ormonde, 28 Sept. 1678, HMC, Ormonde, N. S., iv, 454-5. 
320ates greatly exaggerated, or overestimated, the wealth of the order in England, but he was right 
about the lawyer, Richard Langhorn, who handled Jesuit finances. He supplied Langhorn's name in his 
testimony on the following day. Williamson's notes, 29 Sept. 1678, CSPD, xx (1678), 433. 
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above invention." 33 
The climax came when Oates correctly identified the handwriting on the five letters 
which the Council had taken to be forgeries. Shown only a line or two from each let-
ter and never allowed to see the signatures, "he immediately named whose hands they 
were," 34 whether Blundell's, Fenwick's, Whitbread's, Ireland's, or Fogarty's.35 And he 
had a simple and obvious explanation for why the letters appeared to be forged. The 
Council had been misled, he said in effect, by a standard Jesuit trick. In dangerous cor-
respondence, Jesuits disguised their handwriting and wrote crudely to make their letters 
deniable if they were intercepted. The five letters, he concluded, were genuine. 
The imperturbable ease with which Oates explained away what had seemed a dam-
aging error in his case, along with his apparent ability to recognize the handwriting of 
his former employers, disguised or not, finished what the barrage of facts had started; it 
crumbled what remained of the Council's resistance. The balance of belief swung finally 
and firmly in Oates's favor, and it would not swing back for many months. Oates had 
shown beyond doubt that the country was crawling with popish agents; he had given the 
names and aliases of the most important, along with some addresses. He had not proven 
beyond all conceivable doubt that the agents were conspiring to kill Charles, but he had 
made the possibility too chilling to be ignored by a Protestant Privy Council charged 
with the King's safety. The Council could take no chances. It issued warrants for the 
arrest of six alleged assassins, invited Tonge and Oates to stay in the safety of Whitehall, 
and sent a messenger to the King, asking him to return for a Council meeting next day. 
When Charles returned the following afternoon, 29 September, and convoked his 
Council, the trend of belief was irreversible. Called in for further questioning, Oates 
stumbled on a few details that in retrospect seemed to cast doubt on his stories. He 
misdescribed Don John of Austria; he could not explain satisfactorily why he had mis-
spelled the name of La Chaise,36 to whom he said he had delivered letters, or why he did 
not know the geography of Paris. At the time, however, such incidental missteps were 
buried under the avalanche of information about popish agents, finance, and plots that 
Oates poured forth as he took the Council once more through the crucial parts of his 
narrative.37 In his testimony, he again exculpated the Duke of York, and he agreed that 
33Burnet, ii, 152. 
34Williamson's notes, 28 Sept. 1678, CSPD, xx (1678), 427. 
35 As Kenyon points out (p. 69), Oates's feat of identification should not have been too difficult for a 
man who had written all the letters himself. No member of the Council seems to have brought up this 
possibility. 
360ates was not -the-only one who had trouble with La Chaise; a clerk of the Commons renders it Le 
Chese. HCJ, ix, 525. Sir John Reresby spells it La Shase. Memoires, p. 154. 
37Sir Joseph Williamson, who took notes on the Council meeting, does not even mention Oates's 
momentary embarrassments ( CSPD, xx, 1678, 431-33); nor does Sir Robert Southwell mention them in 
his long letter to the Duke of Ormonde of 1 Oct. 1678. HMC, Ormonde, N. S., iv, 455-57. In long 
retrospect, of course, everyone became marvelously wise and able to see through Oates's impostures, 
and one might suppose from reading the accounts of Warner, for example, that Charles made mincemeat 
out of Oates for the delight of the Privy Council. Actually, Charles did no such thing. He made Oates 
stumble a time or two, but at the end of the session, he and his Council issued warrants for Jesuit 
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his evidence against Sir George Wakeman was hearsay, relayed to him by Dr. Fogarty, 
who had been at the "consult" when Wakeman agreed to poison Charles. On the other 
hand, he further incriminated Edward Coleman, whom he suddenly promoted from bit 
player to principal actor. The day before, Oates had told the Council that Coleman 
corresponded with La Chaise, Louis' confessor, and that he had received (or was soon 
to receive) from La Chaise the first five thousand pounds of the fifteen thousand pounds 
required by Wakeman. Now Oates repeated the charges against Coleman and boldly 
predicted that "if his papers were well looked into there would appear that which might 
cost him his neck." 38 
This assertion, apparently extemporized, seems uncanny in retrospect,39 since it proved 
true and changed the history of England. At the time, it was only one assertion among 
many. Sir Joseph Williamson, who was taking notes on the proceedings, did not even 
bother to write it down. 40 The Council had many other worries. Besides ordering the 
arrest of Coleman and the seizure of his papers, the Council ordered Wakeman to appear 
next day for questioning, and it issued warrants for the arrest of eight Jesuits, including 
Whitbread and Keynes, and of John Smith, Oates's version of a master spy. More gen-
erally, the Council decided to "banish" priests and disarm the papists.41 The Council 
would secure the King and kingdom first and settle degrees of guilt or innocence later. 
Next day (Monday, 30 September) the Council began examining the suspects that 
government agents, aided by Oates, had managed to arrest. 42 They also questioned 
Coleman, who had escaped capture and now appeared voluntarily, and Sir George Wake-
man, who had obeyed the Council's sum1nons. In some respects the sessions resembled 
a counter-attack on Oates, as suspect after suspect denied the charges against him. But 
of course no denials could be convincing. Lying is the trade of foreign agents,43 and res-
olute conspirators can hardly be expected to confess. Sir Robert Southwell, Clerk of the 
Council, was inclined to think that the accused 1nen protested too 1nuch-denying "even 
that which was trivial and apparently otherwise." 44 In any case, beyond firm denials, the 
Council extracted only a few snippets of information from John Smith, William Ireland, 
John Fenwick, Dr. William Fogarty, and Tho1nas Jennison. After the examinations, the 
unruffled Oates was left in possession of the field, while Ireland, Fenwick, Fogarty, and 
Jennison were bundled off to N ewgate. 45 
suspects and a crucial order for disarming all Papists. 
38PRO, PC2/66, fol. 396. 
39 Kenyon (p. 70) calls the statement "an amazingly lucky shot." 
40Williamson notes the testimony about Sir George Wakeman, which immediately preceded the charges 
against Coleman, but he does not say a word about Coleman. CSPD, xx (1678), 431. 
41 The order for the disarming of papists was not issued until the next day (30 Sept), but the decision 
to disarm them was made at the meeting of 29 Sept. Williamson's notes, CSPD, xx (1678), 433. 
42 John Keynes and George Conyers, two principal villains in the Oates narrative, were never captured. 
43Jesuits were believed by Protestants to have a special dispensation from the Pope for lying under 
oath, as well as a special talent for equivocation. At the time of the Plot, the Jesuit suspects had the 
further disadvantage of being in the country illegally and hence malefactors by definition. 
44Sir Robert Southwell to the Duke of Ormonde, 1 Oct. 1678, HMC, Ormonde, N. S., iv, 457. 
45John Smith, who was not charged with complicity in the assassination plot but only with transmitting 
government secrets, was allowed to go free. Kenyon conjectures (p. 71 n.) that he had powerful friends. 
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Sir George Wakeman and Edward Coleman presented special, but not insuperable, 
problems to Oates. 46 The fact that Oates recognized neither man was trivial at the 
time, since he had not yet alleged that he had met either personally; his narrative said 
that he had learned about them, or dealt with them, through his Jesuit superiors.47 
Nor was the fact that Wakeman boasted a long record of conspicuous service to the 
royal family particularly damaging. The most dangerous conspirators, after all, are 
faithful retainers-men above suspicion. The outraged and aggressive Wakeman finally 
set the Council's teeth on edge by dwelling upon his own merits rather than stressing 
his "innocence" of the charges and his "detestation of the matter in question." 48 For the 
time being, however, he was allowed to remain free, since Oates did not "improve" upon 
the hearsay evidence he had offered the day before. 
Coleman was also aggressive and scornful. Young and self-important, he had not yet 
learned that to be too busy and too mouthy is some danger, and he did not dream that 
by failing to do an efficient job of destroying his papers he had already sentenced himself 
to the gallows. Where his fellow suspects had denied too much, Coleman denied too 
little. Proud of his acquaintance with "the great," he freely admitted having met La 
Chaise, though he denied any correspondence with him; proud too of having handled 
important confidential documents, he ad1nitted possessing a cipher for encoding letters 
and decoding letters.49 He further ad1nitted that he had recently made an unauthorized 
journey to Paris. Such border-line admissions meant that although he contemptuously 
denied any knowledge of assassination plots and protested his innocence more effectively 
than Wakeman had done, he could not remove all the Council's doubts-especially since 
Oates, who was perfectly willing to confront the men he accused, repeated his charges 
and added the direct testimony that he himself had carried to La Chaise letters written 
by Coleman. In spite of these handicaps, Coleman argued mightily and even won a small 
concession from the Council. He "made so voluble and fair a defence" 50 that he was 
placed in the hands of a 1nessenger (placed, that is, in the custody of a Crown officer) 
rather than being consigned to Newgate with the other suspects. 
By the end of the session, Oates had survived three days of examination and the first 
wave of counter-attacks. His progress had been astonishing. In less than a month he had 
moved from a cheap tavern to a palace, defeated the attempt of the King to squelch his 
story, jailed several Jesuits, and prompted the disarming of Catholics all over England. 
He had faced without flinching the greatest 1nen in the kingdom, as well as the clerics he 
was pushing towards Tyburn. He had also invented an excuse for appearing as a double-
defector. He had joined the Jesuits, he alleged, as a self-appointed secret agent-to ferret 
out and expose their diabolical schemes. Always a loyal Protestant, he had pretended 
46Sir Joseph Williamson did not take notes on the examinations of Wakeman and Coleman. Apparently 
he did not attend the after-dinner session of the Council, when the two were questioned. 
47It was only later, after Oates had "improved" his testimony that he had to explain away his failure 
to recognize the two men. 
48PRO, PC2/66, fol. 404: BL, Add. MSS, 38015, fol. 283. 
49 He jauntily promised to give the Council his cipher if it had not been seized already with his papers. 
50PRO, PC 2/66, fol. 404; BL, Add. MSS, 38015, fol. 283. 
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conversion in order to betray the plans of England's most inveterate enemies.51 This 
excuse, which implied false oaths and a handful of similar impieties, was not eminently 
praiseworthy or plausible; 52 but it seemed preferable to the admission that he had been a 
genuine convert to popery and had now become a double turncoat, and it was obviously 
much preferable to the further admission that he had been dismissed as an English navy 
chaplain on charges of "unnatural [sexual] practices not to be named" 53 and dismissed 
from a Jesuit seminary as an aggressive homosexual. 54 There would be time to deny his 
past if it threatened to catch up with him. Sensational charges could always be dismissed 
as popish malice. 
For the moment, of course, Oates's reasons for leaving the Jesuits were virtually 
irrelevant. Then as now, defectors were valuable for the accuracy of their information, not 
for the purity of their motives. Conspiracies and secret organizations are seldom betrayed 
by saints, and neurotic traitors often tell the truth. The problem for the government, 
besides catching suspects before they escaped, was to corroborate (or disprove) Oates's 
allegations; and this process, which involved extracting confessions, seizing incriminating 
papers, or finding other witnesses, required time and luck. Charles, who had done all he 
could for the present, left further investigation to a small committee of the Privy Council 
and set off once more for Newmarket-this time for sixteen days. 
When Charles left for the races, he had reason to hope that all might still be well-that 
the whole uproar might end in nothing more lethal than shipping a few Jesuits out of the 
kingdom. At the end of the hearings, he was not convinced that the Jesuits intended to 
kill him, but he was uneasy about them. He had learned, in Southwell's phrase, that they 
were "not the quiet men he thought," and he was unpleasantly surprised at the number of 
them in England. 55 That they were a hopeless political liability was beyond doubt. Now 
that the Council had begun making arrests and disarming papists, garbled versions of the 
Plot story were circulating throughout the country. The level of excitement was rising. 
Any sign of favor for Jesuits or any attempt to stifle a thorough investigation would be 
dangerous. It was essential, in fact, that before Parliament met, on 21 October, the 
government should show great zeal in seeking evidence. Otherwise, the Commons would 
51 Southwell to Ormonde, 1 Oct. 1678, HMC, Ormonde, iv, 455. While temporarily unemployed 
(Southwell explains), Oates "had a mind to a dangerous experiment of knowing the intrigues of the 
Jesuits, ... so yields up himself as a convert about two years and a half ago, and was to perform the 
discipline of his novitiate in agency and journeying, for which he seemed by craft under bluntness and 
an outward simplicity to be well disposed." 
52When Oates swore to Burnet that "he had gone among them [the Jesuits] on purpose to betray 
them," Burnet was disgusted. "This gave me such a character of him," Burnet wrote, "that I could have 
no regard to anything he said or swore after that." Burnet, ii, 153-54. Later, to make Oates's story 
more praiseworthy and plausible, and to enhance his own contribution to the unmasking of villainy, 
Israel Tonge alleged, falsely, that he had sent Oates to spy on the Jesuits-an allegation sometimes 
taken seriously by writers on the Plot. For the actual relationship between Tonge and Oates before 
Oates's return from St. Omers, see Kenyon, pp. 45-51. 
53Burnet, ii, 148. 
54Kenyon, pp. 47, 50. 
55 Sir Robert Southwell to the Duke of Ormonde, 1 Oct. 1678 and 19 Oct. 1678, HMC, Ormonde, N. 
S., iv, 456, 460. 
16 
take over the case. Meanwhile, Charles could hope that no corroborative witnesses would 
appear and that any papist stupid enough to plot against the government would be bright 
enough to burn his papers before they were seized. Certainly, the Jesuits had been given 
adequate warning "of the storm that was coming." 56 If no supporting evidence appeared, 
the sworn statements of Oates would be legally ineffectual. As Charles was later assured 
by three Chief Justices and eight other Justices, "the testimony of one witness alone, 
without further evidence, is not sufficient to indict or convict any person for compassing 
the death of the King." 57 
The King's hopes of calming his subjects and preventing hysteria lasted only seventeen 
days. On 4 October, the Privy Council's committee on the Plot got around to reading 
the letters its agents had seized from Edward Coleman; on 12 October, Sir Edmund 
Berry Godfrey disappeared from his home; and on 17 October Godfrey's dead body was 
discovered on Primrose Hill. These events produced a national frenzy and shattered any 
chance the Crown may have had of managing the consequences of the Oates "revelations." 
That any Coleman letters remained to be discovered was an accident-providential, of 
course, in the opinion of pious Englishmen. Na1ned in Oates's testimony of 28 September, 
a day before the warrant for his arrest was issued, Coleman had been given time to remove 
dangerous papers, and he had destroyed all his most recent correspondence, his letters 
of 1677 and 1678. Unfortunately for himself and the Duke of York, he had somehow 
missed a batch of letters dealing with the previous period. These were seized by agents 
of the Council on the night of 29 September, and on 4 October the most incriminating 
were read by the Council's special investigating committee. The committee members, all 
good royalists, were horrified by what they found. They ordered that Coleman should 
be removed at once from the custody of the messenger and committed to N ewgate. 
Coleman had lied to the Council when he denied having correspondence with Fran<;ois 
La Chaise. Two of his letters to La Chaise-the first dated September 1675-remained 
undestroyed, and both were devastating. 58 In the first Coleman reviewed his dealings 
with La Chaise's Jesuit predecessor, Jean Ferrier. 59 He explained that in 1674 he had 
attempted, with the help of Ferrier, to get £300,000 from Louis XIV for the purpose 
of bribing Charles II to dissolve his anti-French and anti-Catholic Parliament. He had 
56Sir Robert Southwell to the Duke of Ormonde, 5 Oct. 1678, HMC, Ormonde, N. S., iv, 457. By 
5 Oct. Southwell and his clerks had read a great many papers seized from suspects and had found "little 
or nothing" bearing on the Plot. "But 'tis as true [Southwell adds] that if anybody had papers of that 
nature they were early enough upon the guard to put such things out of harm's way, for they were not 
ignorant of the storm that was coming." 
57 CSPD, XX (1678), 471. 
58The second letter, undated, was sent shortly after the first. Both letters, along with a reply from 
La Chaise dated 23 Oct. 1675, were entered in the Journal of the Commons on 31 Oct. 1678. HCJ, 
ix, 525-29. For surviving Coleman letters, including letters to Ferrier and the Papal Nuncio and letters 
from the Jesuit St. Germain, see Sir George Treby, A Collection of Letters and other Writings relating 
to the Horrid Popish Plot: Printed from the Originals in the Hands of George Treby Esq., Chairman 
of the Committee of Secrecy of the Honourable House of Commons. Published by Order of that House. 
London, 1681. See also, HMC, Fitzherbert, pp. 49-113. 
59 For a sketch of Ferrier, see DBF, xiii, 1122-23. 
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solicited the money, of course, on behalf of the Duke of York, and he had declared that 
the interests of James and Louis were "inseparably united." Louis had expressed esteem 
for James and agreed that their interests were "one and the same"-an opinion echoed by 
James, who approved the negotiation.60 The project, which at first had Louis' approval, 
was halted by the death of Ferrier and the intervention of the Marquis de Ruvigny, Louis' 
Huguenot envoy to England, who thought that Charles should be approached directly, 
not through James, and that if bribery was necessary, the price should be much less than 
£300,000-opinions backed by Pomponne, the French foreign minister. 
Having failed to get the Parliament dissolved, Coleman took comfort in the fact that 
it had been prorogued until the following April (1675) and that Ruvigny had given him 
£20,000 to counter anti-French and anti-Catholic measures in the April-June session. He 
had been reasonably successful in this campaign, and now, in late September, 1675, he 
asked La Chaise for another £20,000. Such a sum, skillfully applied, he argued, might 
turn the balance between James and his opponents; it 1night establish James as the 
center of power, the "rising sun" before whom all must bow. Such a triumph, Coleman 
assured La Chaise, would constitute "the greatest blow to the Protestant religion here [in 
England] that ever it received since its birth." It would be a vital step in re-establishing 
Catholicism and removing "heresy and schism." 
Coleman closed his first letter with a peroration on James's "zeal and piety" and his 
devotion to the cause of reconverting England. In his second letter, after explaining to La 
Chaise that he would write secret information in lemon juice, he returned to his theme. 
In memorable words that would indeed cost him his neck, he declared: 
We have here a mighty work upon our hands, no less than the conversion of 
three kingdoms, and by that perhaps the utter subduing of a pestilent heresy 
which has domineered over great part of this northern world a long time. There 
were never such hopes of success since the death of our Queen Mary as now in 
our days when God has given us a prince who is become (I may say by miracle) 
zealous of being the author and instru1nent of so glorious a work.61 
Legally, Coleman's correspondence presented few problems. Lord Chief Justice Sir 
Francis North, who attended the Privy Council meeting on 16 October and heard the 
crucial letters read, pronounced them treasonous "on the spot." 62 And when the three 
Chief Justices and eight other judges were formally requested by the King to decide 
"whether it .be .not treason to endeavour to extirpate the religion established in this 
kingdom and to introduce the Pope's authority by combination and assistance of foreign 
powers," they unanimously answered that "the same is high treason." 63 
6
°Coleman to La Chaise, 29 Sept. 1675, HCJ, ix (1678), 525. 
61 Coleman to La Chaise, undated (c. 1 Oct 1675), HCJ, ix, 529. 
62Sir Robert Southwell to the Duke of Ormonde, 19 Oct. 1678, HMC, Ormonde, N. S., iv, 460. 
63 CSPD, XX (1678), 471. 
18 
But if Coleman's offense was legally silnple, the political problems it raised were 
complex and virulent. If he had been hired by Marvell64 or Shaftesbury to blast the 
Duke of York and defame the King, he could hardly have succeeded better. Throughout 
his letters Coleman pictured Charles as weak and venal-personally sympathetic to the 
Catholic cause and to his brother's aspirations but unwilling to venture anything and 
hopelessly addicted to money. The King's need and love for money, Coleman wrote to 
the Papal Nuncio, was greater than his fears of Parliament, and if the Duke had money, 
he could readily buy the King's support for himself and the Catholic cause; "for there 
is nothing it [money] cannot make him [Charles] do," Coleman explained, "though it 
were as much to his prejudice as this we endeavour to persuade him to will be to his 
advantage." 65 "Logic," Coleman later told La Chaise, "in our court, built upon money, 
has more powerful charms than any other sort of reasoning." 66 
The King's Council was furious that a lowly secretary had dared to cast such con-
temptuous reflections upon the King, but the 1nembers and the King himself were even 
more furious at the picture he had given of Ja1nes. With something akin to panic, they 
realized that Coleman had shown James to be exactly what his opponents had asserted 
for years-a popish bigot intent upon overturning the Protestant establishment. James, 
Coleman told La Chaise, had been 
... converted to such a degree of zeal and piety as not to regard anything in 
the world in comparison of God Almighty's glory, the salvation of his own soul, 
and the conversion of our poor kingdom, which has a long time been oppressed 
and miserably harassed by heresy and schism. 67 
To complete the picture, Coleman had shown James conniving with Louis, Protestant 
Europe's most dangerous enemy, and agreeing that their interests were identical. As 
Sir Robert Southwell contemplated the effect the Coleman letters would have upon his 
colleagues in the House of Commons, he predicted sadly: 
... it will appear that nothing has for these 1nany years been spoken within those 
walls that sounded like malice and mutiny that Mr. Coleman, by the letters 
he wrote and the correspondence he maintained, does not give the utmost 
provocation for, and this, I fear, to the irreparable damage of his master ... 68 
Fortunately for James, while Coleman had been picturing him as zealous and ded-
icated, he had also pictured him as not stunningly intelligent. Coleman had implied 
64Marvell had died on 16 Aug. 1678. He was buried 18 Aug. in the church of St. Giles-in-the-Fields, 
within a stone's throw of Lord Wharton's town house. 
65 Coleman to the Papal Nuncio, 23 Oct. 1674, Sir George Treby, A Collection of Letters ... , p. 13. 
66 Coleman to La Chaise, 29 Sept. 1675, HCJ, ix (1678), 526. 
67Coleman to La Chaise, 29 Sept. 1675, HCJ, ix (1678), 529. 
68Southwell to Ormonde, 22 Oct. 1678, HMC, Ormonde, N. S., iv, 460-61. 
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throughout the letters that James was incapable of originating anything and that he 
relied upon truly talented men like Coleman himself to devise strategies and carry on 
negotiations. As Coleman's Jesuit friend St. Germain had explained to La Chaise, the 
success of the Duke in promoting Catholic interests had proceeded "by the inspiration 
of Mr. Coleman." 69 The fact that Coleman took credit for initiating the Duke's suicidal 
negotiations with Louis and that he obviously considered himself several degrees brighter 
than his master-more like James's guardian than his servant-enabled James to dis-
avow, more or less plausibly, some of the sentiments and actions attributed to him. The 
further fact that Coleman was what a more refined generation would call an egotistical 
snot, that he undoubtedly held the views he attributed to James, and that he had been 
formally, if not actually, dismissed from the service of the Duke and Duchess as a political 
liability helped to soften the blows he had delivered. And the character references that 
Titus Oates had provided for James and Charles reduced the injuries further. 
The damage, nevertheless, was severe. In effect, Coleman had helped Shaftesbury 
found the Whig party and had originated three bills for excluding James from the throne. 
He had also given the Crown a vexing problem-how to convict and hang him without 
incriminating the Duke of York. For parlia1nentary battles to come, he had placed the 
government on the defensive and delivered the initiative to its opponents. 
More dangerously for the immediate future, the Coleman letters seemed to verify 
Oates's testimony on the Plot. Oates had been right when he accused Coleman of 
corresponding with La Chaise-of soliciting money from Jesuits for the subversion of the 
English government. He had been right about a popish plot. The fact that no letters 
dealing with the murder of Charles were found among Coleman's papers-that there 
was nothing in the correspondence confirming the Plot-scarcely mattered at the time. 
Coleman had destroyed all his papers from the period covered by Oates's testimony, 
and it was easy for English1nen to suppose that the missing letters were more damning 
than those that remained. It was also easy for pestilent heretics to consider the plot 
against Protestantism more deadly than the assassination plot (which was, after all, only 
a component of the general plan). In these circumstances, the Coleman letters and the 
confused accounts of them that spread through London swelled the reputation of Titus 
Oates and contributed heavily to the rising tide of hysteria. 
On 17 October, the day after the King's return from Newmarket, came the last ingre-
dient necessary for true panic-the dead body of Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey. Last seen 
alive on Saturday afternoon, 12 October, Godfrey was found dead on Thursday evening 
in a ditch at the foot of Primrose Hill. The body was transfixed with Godfrey's sword, 
but as the Coroner explained to the Privy Council, "No blood [was) near the place [of the 
stab wound) nor where the body was, [and) none under the hilt of the sword." It seemed 
clear, therefore, that Godfrey had died so1ne time before being stab bed. There was a 
"bruise on the top of the breast just under the collar," the Coroner said, as well as a 
"circle round his neck like those that are strangled." The fact that the "body did stink" 
showed that Godfrey had been dead several days, and the fact that on Tuesday evening a 
69St. Germain to Coleman, 19/29 Jan. 1676, 'Ire by, A Collection of Letters .. . , pp. 30-31. 
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witness had gone "by that place" to water his horse and wash his hands in a nearby pond 
and had seen nothing showed that the body had not been there at that time. Again, the 
fact that Godfrey's shoes were "extreme clean" see1ned to prove that he had not walked 
into the dirty field where he was found. 70 The Coroner also noted that "two fields off" 
there were tracks where a coach had turned out of Paddington road into the corner of 
a field and then "gone back the same way." The Coroner did not conclude in so many 
words that Godfrey had been beaten and strangled, kept somewhere for three or four 
days, then taken out (perhaps by coach) to the ditch where he was found, and at last 
run through with his own sword, though these were the inferences that seemed to follow; 
nor did he add that Godfrey's money was found in his pocket (a fact which seemed to 
rule out robbery) or that there were "many drops of white wax-light on his breeches" 71 
(a fact which Gilbert Burnet, who viewed the body, thought highly significant). But the 
Coroner's evidence, however incomplete, spelled murder (and multiple murderers) to the 
members of the Privy Council, as it would later to a coroner's jury. The same evening, 
20 October, the Council issued a proclamation offering a reward of £500 "for a discovery 
of the murderers of Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey, with a pardon to any of the murderers 
that shall discover the rest." 72 
When news of Godfrey's strange death swept through London, the citizens had no 
difficulty in deciding who the murderers were. Here was obviously a text-book case 
of Jesuit revenge and terror, "a pattern of their way of proceeding," after the manner 
explained by Oates and anti-papist literature. Godfrey had accepted Oates's narrative 
and guaranteed that its explosive contents could not be suppressed; hence he had been 
marked for death. And he had been assassinated in a way designed to make other 
enemies of the Jesuits think twice before they lent the1nselves to anti-Jesuit investigations. 
Godfrey's "impudent murder," Londoners concluded, had been done "in terror to any 
that should be active in these inquiries." 73 
Later there would be time to worry about such niceties as which papists had perpe-
trated the killing, where they had kept the body, and why they had been mad enough to 
commit a murder so sure to bring bloody reprisals. 74 For the moment the problem was to 
prevent further assassinations and protect England against the insurrections the Jesuits 
had planned. It was a time to guard against knives, fires, and explosives-time to call 
out the militia. Meanwhile, the body of Sir Ed1nund Berry Godfrey, now a Protestant 
martyr, was placed on view where Londoners could see for themselves the horrors of 
70Sir Joseph Williamson's notes on Coroner's report to the Council, 20 Oct. 1678, CSPD, xx (1678), 
472. 
71 Burnet, ii, 156. 
72 CSPD, XX (1678), 472. 
73Southwell to Ormonde, 19 Oct. 1678, 26 Oct. 1678, HMC, Ormonde, N. S., iv, 460, 463. 
74The death of Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey has never been satisfactorily explained; the case has never 
been "solved." The major theories-that it was the work of the papists who were tried and executed 
for the murder (or some others), that it was the work of clever Protestant provocateurs (perhaps hired 
by Shaftesbury), that it was suicide elaborately disguised as murder to prevent the Crown from seizing 
Godfrey's estate-all have very serious flaws, as does the theory that Godfrey was murdered by the 
psychotic Earl of Pembroke. Not surprisingly, the best summary of the current state of speculation is 
that of Kenyon (pp. 264-70). 
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popish treachery. In the violent wave of panic that followed the murder, the peaceful 
London of Charles II had suddenly become a city under popish siege, and the words of 
Titus Oates had suddenly become gospel. 
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